A secret-key generation scheme based on a layered broadcasting strategy is introduced for slow-fading channels. In the model considered, Alice wants to share a key with Bob while keeping the key secret from Eve, who is a passive eavesdropper. Both Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels are assumed to undergo slow fading, and perfect channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be known only at the receivers during the transmission. In each fading slot, Alice broadcasts a continuum of coded layers and, hence, allows Bob to decode at the rate corresponding to the fading state (unknown to Alice). The index of a reliably decoded layer is sent back from Bob to Alice via a public and error-free channel and used to generate a common secret key.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1 , we consider a three-terminal model, in which Alice and Bob want to share a secret key in the presence of Eve, who is a passive eavesdropper. That is, Eve is interested in stealing the key but does not attempt to interfere with the key generation processes.
A. Channel Model
The Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels (forward channels) undergo block fading, in which the channel gains are constant within a block while varying independently from block to block [11] . We assume that each block is associated with a time slot of duration T and bandwidth B; that is, N = ⌊2BT ⌋ real symbols can be sent in each slot. We also assume that the number of channel uses within each slot (i.e., N ) is large enough to allow for invoking random coding arguments.
Let us assume that the transmissions in the forward channels take place over M time slots. In a time slot indexed by m ∈ [1, . . . , M ], Alice sends X m , which is a vector of N real symbols. Bob receives Y 1m through the channel gain h 1m and Eve receives Y 2m through the channel gain h 2m . A discrete time baseband-equivalent block-fading channel model can be expressed as
for t = 1, 2, where {Z tm } are sequences of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian N (0, 1) random variables. We denote by h 1m and h 2m the states of the Alice-Bob and AliceEve channels, respectively, in time slot m. Without loss of generality, we drop the index m and denote random channel realizations by h t . We assume that h t is a real random variable with a probability density function (PDF) f t and a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F t , for each t = 1, 2. We also let h 1 = [h 1,1 , . . . , h 1,M ] and h 2 = [h 2,1 , . . . , h 2,M ] denote the power gain vectors for the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels, respectively.
We assume that Bob and Eve know their own channel gains perfectly; Alice does not know the CSI before its transmission, except for the channel statistics.
In addition, we assume a short term power constraint (excluding power variation across time slots) such that the average power of the signal X m per slot satisfies the constraint
for all m = 1, . . . , M .
Finally, we assume that there exists an error-free feedback channel from Bob to Alice, through which Bob can feed back Ψ m for time slot m, where Ψ m is a deterministic function of Y 1m and h 1,m . The feedback channel is assumed to be public, and therefore Ψ m is received by both Alice and Eve without any error.
B. Secret Key Generation Protocol
The secret key generation protocol consists of two phases: a communication phase and a key-generation phase.
1) Communication Phase:
We assume that the transmission during the communication phase takes place over After the transmission, Bob uses the feedback channel to send Ψ = (Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ M ), which is received by both Alice and Eve since the feedback channel is public and error-free.
2) Key-Generation Phase: The communication phase is followed by a key-generation phase, in which both
Alice and Bob generate the key based on the forward and backward signals. A general key-generation phase can be described as in the following.
Let K = {1, 2, . . . , 2 nRs }, where R s represents the secrecy key rate. Alice generates a secret key k ∈ K by using a decoding function K, i.e.,
Bob generates the secret keyk ∈ K by using a decoding functionK, i.e.,
where the second equality holds since we assume that Ψ is a deterministic function of Y 1 and h 1 .
The secrecy level at Eve is measured by the equivocation rate R e defined as the entropy rate of the key K conditioned upon the observations at Eve, i.e., R e 1 n H(K|Y 2 , h 2 , Ψ).
Definition 1. A secrecy key rate R s is achievable if the conditions
and R e ≥ R s − ǫ,
are satisfied for any ǫ > 0 as the number of channel uses n → ∞.
III. A LAYERED BROADCAST APPROACH TO KEY GENERATION
In this section, we introduce a broadcast approach for secret-key generation, in which Gaussian layered broadcast coding is used for the communication phase, and random secrecy binning is used for the key generation phase.
Before presenting the scheme, we briefly introduce Gaussian layered broadcast coding. Finite-level layered broadcast coding (superposition coding) was introduced by Cover in [31] for general broadcast channels. In [28] , Shamai studied a Gaussian fading channel with no CSI at the transmitter and considered the limiting case when there is a continuum of coded layers. In this section, we first take a look at a fading wiretap channel with a finite number of fading states, for which finite level layered broadcast coding is applicable. The channel will be used to derive the result for the limiting case of continuous fading, which is the focus of this paper.
A. Finite-Level Layered Broadcast Coding for L-State Fading Channel
Let us first consider a type of channel called "the L-state fading wiretap channel," in which there are L different fading states possibly observed on the Alice-Bob or Alice-Eve channel.
Definition 2.
In an L-state fading wiretap channel, at any time slot, the realization of the power gain of the Alice-Bob or Alice-Eve channel takes one value from {h [1] , h [2] , . . . , h [L] } independently and randomly, and is characterized by probability function
Without loss of generality, we assume that {h [l] } are ordered in ascending order.
Here, let us focus on the Alice-Bob channel. As shown in Fig. 2 , in a layered broadcast coding scheme, the point-to-point fading channel is viewed as a broadcast channel with L virtual receivers each corresponding to a fading state. By applying the superposition coding in [31] , the encoding and decoding procedures can be described as follows. During the encoding, we assume that L layers are used. That is, the transmitted codeword is a superposition
No CSIT
is a codeword from a Gaussian codebook C [l] with a rate r [l] and a constant power p [l] , l = 1, . . . , L. For a given power allocation {p [l] }, the rate of the l-th layer is given by
and the total power satisfies L l=1 p [l] = P . During the decoding, for a given fading realization h [l] , the receiver can successfully decode the first l layers by using the successive decoding strategy [31] . i.e., the codewords {X [1] , . . . , X [l] } can be decoded reliably, while the codewords {X [l+1] , . . . , X [L] } are undecodable. More specifically, in the decoding process, the receiver first decodes X [1] by treating the remaining codewords ({X [i] , i > 1}) as interference. After decoding X [1] , the receiver will subtract X [1] and then decode X [2] by treating the remaining codewords ({X [i] , i > 2}) as interference. This process repeats until the l-th layer X [l] is decoded reliably by treating the remaining codewords ({X [i] , i > l}) as interference. As shown in (8),
is the total power of coded layers treated as inference during the decoding of the l-th layer. Note that this predetermined ordering can be achieved because of the degraded nature of Gaussian single-input single-output (SISO) channels.
B. Layered Broadcast Coding for Gaussian Fading Channels
In general, L depends on the cardinality of the random channel variable. For a Gaussian fading channel, a continuum of code layers (L → ∞) is required for achieving the best performance. When a continuum of layers is used, the transmitter sends an infinite number of layers of coded information. Each layer conveys a fractional rate, denoted by dR, whose value depends on the index of the layer. We refer to s, the realization 1 All logarithms are to the natural base, and thus rates are in terms of nats per second per Hertz.
of the fading power, as a continuous index. For a given transmit power distribution ρ(s) over coded layer s, ρ(s)ds is the transmit power used by layer s. Any layer indexed by u satisfying u > s is undecodable and functions as additional interference. The total power of undecodable layers (for a realization of fading power s) is denoted by I(s) and is expressed by
The incremental differential rate of layer s is given by
where the second equality in (10) is due to the fact that lim x→0 log(1 + x) = x for any x ≥ 0. The total power over all layers is constrained by
Given a realization of the fading power (or layer index) s, the decodable rate at the receiver is
Hence, for a given CDF of the random fading power s denoted by F (s), the average decodable rate at the receiver is
C. Secret-Key Generation Based on Layered Broadcast Coding
In this section, we discuss key generation based on Gaussian layered broadcast coding. We outline the scheme for the continuous case when L → ∞, which is the focus of this paper. For an L-state fading wiretap channel when L is finite, the corresponding scheme is discussed in Appendix A.
1) Codebook Construction:
We need two types of codebooks used for the communication and key-generation phases, respectively.
The codebook used for the communication phase consists of a continuum of coded layers represented by
where N is the codeword length and dR(s) is the (incremental differential) rate at layer s. The (sub-)codebook for each layer is generated randomly and independently. That is, for any codebook
, where w = 1, 2, . . . , 2 N dR(s) , by choosing the N 2 N dR(s) Gaussian symbols (with power ρ(s)ds) independently at random.
The codebook used for the key generation phase is based on Wyner's secrecy coding [1] , [12] . As shown in Fig. 3 , we use
to represent the average decodable rate at Bob. We first generate all binary sequences of length n(R − ǫ), denoted by B, where n = M N . The sequences B are then randomly and uniformly grouped into K = 2 nRs bins each with n(R − R s − ǫ) sequences, where R s is the achievable secrecy rate given later. We denote by v(k, j) the j-th codeword in the k-th bin, where 1 ≤ k ≤ K and 1 ≤ j ≤ J = 2 n(R−Rs−ǫ) . Each secret key k ∈ {1, . . . , K} is then randomly assigned to a bin, denoted by B(k) = {v(k, j), j = 1, . . . , J}. Note that the feedback of a layer index does not need to be completed right after each transmission in the forward channel. It is required only before the following key generation phase. Also note that the feedback of the index of a decodable layer is a special type of channel feedback. In particular, when considering the case when the number of fading states L → ∞, the index of the highest decodable layer in time slot m is equal to the fading power gain h 1m (i.e., the public feedback Ψ m = h 1m ). For a finite level layered coding approach, the feedback of the layer index is an L-bit quantized version of the realization of the fading power gain. When L = 1, it is the ARQ feedback of ACK or NACK.
2) Communication
3) Key-Generation Phase: Once the communication phase (including feedback) is completed, both Alice and Bob can generate the secret key. Based on the feedback sequence Ψ = h 1 , Alice generates a binary sequence v from all the messages reliably decoded by Bob based on any deterministic one-to-one mapping g
where
) represents the set of messages successfully decoded by Bob across all layers and time slots. 2 To be more accurate, D1 in W
should be indexed by m, however, we choose to use D1 to simplify our notation. Throughout the paper, W
. If the subscript of W is a set, then D1 is also indexed by the set. For example, for a set of
to represent all the messages decoded by Bob in M + . The rule is also applied to D2, U1 and U2. In addition, it is applied to codeword X and codebook C besides message W . Alice then looks up in the key-generation codebook for a k such that v ∈ B(k), and outputs k as the secret key generated. Note that all those messages are decoded by Bob, and Bob can generate the same sequence v and the same key k as Alice does. This completes the key generation.
IV. SECRECY KEY RATE
In this section, we present the secrecy key rate achieved by the broadcast approach and compare it to that achieved by using a single-level coding approach. For both approaches, we assume that the number of time slots used in the transmission over the forward channel is sufficiently large (i.e., M → ∞), so that we can obtain an ergodic key rate.
A. Layered-Broadcast-Coding Based Key Generation
The following result characterizes the secrecy rate when a power distribution ρ(s) is given. Theorem 1. For a given power distribution ρ(s) over coded layers indexed by s, the secrecy key rate achieved by the layered-broadcast-coding based key generation scheme is
and
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix A. Now we discuss some insights from Theorem 1. First, R s can be written as
where∆
The key rate R s is the average of rewards (designated by∆(h 1 , h 2 )) collected from all possible channel realizations. Positive rewards are obtained from the time slots in which Bob's channel is better than Eve's channel (h 1 > h 2 ). On the other hand, when h 1 ≤ h 2 , the reward is zero.
We can see that except for the rare case in which h 1 is always smaller than h 2 , R s is positive.
Now we focus on a particular time slot m in which h 1 > h 2 , and use X m to denote all layers sent in the slot. 3 As depicted in Fig. 4 , X m can be divided as
m denote the sets of decodable and undecodable layers at Bob, respectively, and
m denote the sets of decodable and undecodable layers at Eve, respectively. Note that X
Both Alice and Bob can decode X m . Therefore, a nonzero reward ∆(h 1 , h 2 ) comes from the set of layers X
m . To show this, we rewrite (17) as
The first term on the right hand side of (22) is the sum-rate decoded by Bob from X m as noise). Furthermore, the second term can be written as
By noticing that I(h 2 ) − I(h 1 ) is the total power used for the layers X
m , and I(h 1 ) is the total power used for the layers X An interesting finding here is that what the best Eve can do is to treat the interference term X
m as noise (as Bob does) with the total noise power 1 + h 2 I(h 1 ), and therefore cannot benefit from the structure of interference either. Due to the absence of CSI at the transmitter during the transmission in the forward channel , the layered broadcast coding strategy creates a medium with interference, in which the undecodable layers play the role of self-interference. We remark that this is a special case of secret communication over a medium with interference as discussed in [27] .
B. Single-Level-Coding Based Key Generation
When single-level coding is used, self-interference does not occur. Alice uses a codebook with a single coding rate in the forward transmission. Bob uses ARQ feedback to tell Alice whether the decoding is successful or has failed. In this case, the following secrecy key rate can be achieved.
Lemma 1. [30, Theorem 1]
The secrecy key rate of a single-level-coding based scheme is given by
where R [1] is the coding rate of the single-level codebook.
This key rate R [1] s still has the interpretation of the average of rewards (designated by∆ 1 (h 1 , h 2 )) collected from all possible channel realizations. That is, R [1] s can be written as
C. Comparisons and Discussions
The advantage of the layered-broadcast-coding (LBC) based approach over the single-level-coding based approach (SLC) can be readily observed by comparing the reward functions given by (20) and (26) . First, in LBC, a positive reward is obtained from the set of channel pairs
is obtained from the channel set
It is obvious that P ⊃ P ′ , which means there are more time slots that contribute to the secrecy key generation for LBC than for SLC. Second, the coding rate R [1] for SLC has to be carefully chosen in order to balance between obtaining a larger value of reward in a time slot (by increasing R [1] ) and making more time slots contribute to the key generation (by decreasing R [1] ); while in LBC, the reward is gained in each time slot adaptively based on the random channel realizations. Finally and importantly, in SLC, Eve can deduce the information at the rate of log(1 + h 2 P ) with a channel gain h 2 . This is the loss of rate in order to keep the key secret from Eve. In LBC, however, Eve deduces less information as given by (23) due to the interference power (the total power of undecodable layers). The self-interference plays an important role for decreasing Eve's capability of eavesdropping.
Hence, although the single-level-coding based approach has lower decoding complexity, and requires less feedback (only 1-bit per time slot), it is sub-optimal in general (when feedback of multiple bits is allowed). By all means, the single-level coding scheme can be considered as a special case of a layered-broadcast-coding based scheme, in which all power is allocated to a single layer. It serves as a baseline scheme and further motivates us to find the best power distribution for optimizing the layered-broadcast-coding scheme.
V. OPTIMAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we derive the optimal distribution of power over coded layers for our broadcast approach.
The secrecy rate given by (16) is hard to evaluate and optimize due to the three-dimensional integrals. After some steps of derivations, we have an alternative form given as follows:
Lemma 2. The secrecy key rate given by (16) is equivalent to
with the constraint I(0) = P , and ρ(x) = −dI(x)/dx.
Proof:
The proof can be found in Appendix E.
A. Optimal Interference Distribution
In certain cases, optimization of R s with respect to the power distribution ρ(x), or equivalently, the interference distribution I(x), under the power constraint P can be found by using the calculus of variations. First, we define the functional of (27) as
A necessary condition for a maximum of the integral of L(x, I(x), I ′ (x)) over x is a zero variation of the functional. By solving the associated Eüler-Lagrangian equation [32] given as
we have the following characterization for the optimal I(x).
Theorem 2.
A necessary condition for optimizing I(x) in order to maximize the secrecy rate given by (27) is to choose I(x) to satisfy
where I(x) = 0 when x < x 0 or x ≥ x 1 . Here, x 0 and x 1 can be found by setting I(x 0 ) = P and I(x 1 ) = 0
in (29).
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix F.
In general, numerical computation is needed for solving (29) in order to obtain the optimal interference distribution I(x). For some special CDFs F 2 (x), an analytical form of I(x) is possible if the integral in (29) can be evaluated in a closed form.
In the following, we consider two of such special cases:
1) Non-Fading Alice-Eve Channel:
If the Alice-Eve channel is constant with channel power gain x * , the
, where µ(x) represents a unit step function. In this case, the optimal interference distribution is given by
which can be easily shown from (29) .
2) Non-Secret Layered Transmission: If key-generation is not considered and it is desired to find the optimal I(x) to maximize the average reliably decodable rate at Bob in the non-secret layered transmission, this can be done by assuming x * = 0 in (30) . In this case, we have
which is consistent with the result given in [29] .
B. Secrecy Key Rate With Optimal Power Distribution
Finally, we have the following secrecy key rate under the optimal power distribution.
Corollary 1.
When the optimal power distribution is used, the following secrecy key rate is achieved:
where I(x) and (x 0 , x 1 ) are found from the condition given by Theorem 2.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by combining Lemma 2 and Theorem 2.
VI. A RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNEL
In this section, we assume Rayleigh fading for both Alive-Bob and Alice-Eve channels. The fading gains h t are exponentially distributed with means λ t for t = 1, 2. That is, the PDFs of the fading gain h t are
for t = 1, 2 and the CDFs are
A. Single-Level-Coding Approach
For comparison, we first calculate the secrecy key rate when single-level coding is used. As shown in Appendix G, the secrecy rate is
is the exponential integral function. It can be verified that the above function is concave with respect to R [1] and thus has a unique maximum, which can be searched numerically.
B. Layered-Coding Approach
According to (32) , the secrecy rate with layered coding under the optimal power control is computed numerically by evaluating
where the optimal interference distribution I(x) and boundary points x 0 and x 1 can be found according to Lemma 2 as follows.
Interference Distribution I(x)
As shown in Appendix H, we have
We also have
Therefore, we can show after some steps of arrangements that I(x) is found by solving
Boundary Points x 0 and x 1
We needs to find the boundary points x 0 and x 1 to meet the constraints that I(x 0 ) = P and I(x 1 ) = 0.
By letting I(x 0 ) = P in (38), we can solve the equation for x 0 . However, x 1 cannot be solved by this means since we cannot let I(x 1 ) = 0 in (38). Instead, we let I(x 1 ) = 0 in (29) and find that
Therefore, x 1 can be found by solving the following equation:
Interestingly, x 1 depends only on the channel statistics (characterized by λ 1 and λ 2 for the Rayleigh fading channels) and not on the power constraint P . Note that no power will be allocated to a layer with its index higher than x 1 (however, it is possible that some layers lower than x 1 still have zero power allocation, as shown in the numerical example). Finally, we remark that every equation discussed in this section has a unique solution after excluding a trivial solution 0.
C. Numerical Examples
Now we show some numerical examples on the achievable secrecy-key rates and the optimal power distribution ρ(s). We consider the symmetric Rayleigh fading channel defined by (33) with λ 1 = λ 2 = 1. each time slot. We still assume a short-term power constraint and thus Alice does not adapt power in contrast to the scheme given by [12] . Without CSI at Alice, the secrecy key rate achieved by the layered-coding based scheme is significantly higher. This shows the benefit of the broadcast approach due to the introduction of self-interference in transmission. Fig. 6 shows the optimal power distribution over coded layers. A trend is that more power is distributed to lower layers as the total transmit power P becomes larger. In general, the optimal power distribution does not concentrate much on a certain layer (or a small set of layers), especially when P is large. We also compare the optimal power distribution for maximizing the secrecy key rate in key-generation and that for maximizing the average reliably decodable rate at Bob in non-secret transmission. With different power constraints, the power distributions for non-secret transmission are on the same curve but have different boundary points, which is different from the case for key generation. Also, when the total transmit power exceeds a certain threshold, the power distribution for key generation is more concentrated over higher layers (as shown for the cases of P = 5 and P = 20); while the opposite can be observed when P is small (as shown for the case of P = 1 in 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a broadcast approach for secret-key generation over slow-fading channels based on layered broadcast coding. We have considered a model in which Alice attempts to share a key with Bob while keeping the key secret from Eve. Both Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels are assumed to undergo slow fading, and perfect CSI is assumed to be known only at the receivers during the transmission. Layered coding facilitates adapting the reliably decoded rate at Bob to the actual channel state without CSI available at Alice.
The index of a reliably decoded layer is sent back to Alice via an authenticated, public and error-free channel, which is exploited by Alice and Bob to generate the secret key. We have derived the achievable secrecy key rate and characterized the optimal power distribution over coded layers. Our theoretical and numerical results have shown that the broadcast approach outperforms the single-level-coding based approach significantly, which establishes the important role of introducing self-interference in facilitating secret-key generation over slowfading channels when transmit CSI is not available.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us first consider the L-state fading wiretap channel defined by Definition 2. We have the following result.
Lemma A.1. For the L-state fading wiretap channel defined by Definition 2, the following key-rate is achievable:
where we assume that {h [1] 
is given by
.
Proof: We relegate the proof of Lemma A.1 to Appendix B.
It is easy to observe that the result given by Theorem 1 is a continuous version of Lemma A.1 (as L → ∞), and can be shown by following some standard steps in a straightforward manner. We omit these steps and next prove Lemma A.1 only.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA A.1
A. Secret-Key Generation For The L-State Fading Wiretap Channel
The key-generation scheme for the L-state fading wiretap channel is similar to the scheme outlined in Section III-C. The encoding and decoding in the communication phase have been discussed in Section III-B. To proceed with the key generation phase, we will use the following notation (some of which has been explained previously but is repeated here for ease of reference).
Let W m = W (for t = 1, 2) to represent the sets of reliably decoded, and undecodable layers, respectively. Furthermore,
M ) are the set, reliably decoded set, and undecodable set of codewords, respectively, over all M time slots. In addition, In the key generation phase, two parameters of the key generation codebook are R and R s . For the L-state fading wiretap channel, R s is given by (39) and R is given by
where r [i] is given by (40).
B. Genie-Leaked Information
In the communication phase, we assume that the message conveyed by each layer is chosen independently of those at all other layers and uniformly at random. That is, at time slot m, the message W
m sent by the l-th layer, is randomly and uniformly selected from {1, 2, . . . , 2 N r
[l] }. One can always assume that the random message is generated through a two-step procedure: first, two messagesŴ
m are selected randomly and independently, whereŴ
m is formed. Note that this procedure is assumed only for facilitating the proof and is not actually required for encoding.
In fact,r [l] m can be any value as long as 0 ≤r
. For example, we can assume the following value for r
where l 1m is the feedback layer index (i.e., the highest index of the decodable layers at Bob) in time slot m. Again, the feedback and channel information are not needed during the transmission since the two-step procedure is not actually executed.
Following the partitioning of messages, we haveŴ
We assume that there is a genie who gives the message setW [U1] to Eve. This is a useful step to enable us to give a bound on the equivocation rate with respect to the key K at Eve.
One might wonder if this genie-leaked information benefits Eve and eventually reduces the achievable key rate. In Fig. 7 , we illustrate that the genie-leaked information does not benefit Eve. Here, let us consider a special L-state fading wiretap channel for which L = 3 and the support of both Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channel gains is {h [1] , h [2] , h [3] }. It is easy to see thatW
m = ∅ if and only if h 1m = h [2] and h 2m = h [1] for a time slot m. Therefore, we can focus on such a time slot. We have D 1m = {1, 2}, U 1m = {3}, D 2m = {1}, and U 2m = {2, 3}. X [1] m is decoded and subtracted by both Alice and Bob from their received signals. Therefore, we consider only X [2] m and X [3] m , where X [2] m contributes to the key generation and Eve tries to deduce information on X [2] m , while X [3] m plays the role of interference. Fig. 7 shows the rate of information that Eve can deduce on X [2] m versus the rate of interference codebook. (The rate region resembles that of a multiple access channel. Some related discussion can be found in [27] .)
Eve uses the genie-leaked information to reduce the rate of interference codebook. To achieve this, Eve useš W [3] m to obtain a thinned codebook C [3] (W [3] m ). That is, among all the codewords in the original codebook C [3] , i.e. only the ones corresponding toW [3] m are kept and the rest are eliminated. However, if the side information is given properly, Eve does not benefit from the genie. As shown in Fig. 7 , the side information does not help Eve's eavesdropping ifȓ [3] m ≤ r [3] − log 1 + h 2m p [3] .
Under this condition, the pair of coding rates of C [2] and C [3] (W [3] is collected from time slot m in contributing to the key generation.
C. Equivocation Calculation
Now, we are ready to compute the equivocation rate with respect to the key K at Eve:
where (43) is from the property that conditioning reduces entropy, (44) is due to the fact that Ψ is a deterministic function of h 1 and Y 2 .
As shown in Appendix C and D, the two terms in (45) can be bounded as in the following,
and 
which gives the perfect secrecy requirement that is
where δ → 0 as n → ∞ (actually N, M → ∞). Hence, we complete the proof.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF (46)
First, let us denote
Due to independent coding at each time slot during forward transmission, we have
m , h 1m , h 2m ).
Furthermore, we have
where M + = {m|m ∈ {1, . . . , M }, h 1m ≥ h 2m } is the set of time slots in which Alice-Bob channel is better than Alice-Eve channel), (49) follows from the property that entropy is non-negative, (50) follows from the property thatW
forms a Markov chain, and (51) follows from the property that conditioning reduces entropy.
To bound (52) further, we have
where l 1m denotes the index of the highest decodable layer at Bob in time slot m, and (53) follows from (42).
where l 2m denotes the index of the highest decodable layer at Eve in time slot m, and δ 1 → 0 as N → ∞.
Combining (52), (54), and (55), we have
denotes the number of time slots (out of M slots) that
When M → ∞, we have
where δ 2 → 0 when N → ∞ and M → ∞.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF (47)
First, we denote
To give a bound on E 2 , we consider Eve's decoding of X, i.e., the codewords sent over all L layers and M time slots, by assuming that Eve observes Y 2 and h 2 , and is given (by a genie) the side information K,
, where X [U1] plays the role of interference and is not used in the key generation. To bound E 2 , however, we need Eve to decode the interference given the genie-aided side information.
Given h 1 and h 2 , Eve is able to partition X as
where M + = {m|m = 1, . . . , M, and
and X M − = {X m |m ∈ M − }. We consider the decoding of X M + and X M − separately as in the following subsections.
A. Decoding of X M −
We note that X M − can be partitioned as
Based on Y 2m and side informationW m for layer l ∈ U 2m , we
m , which is available since we have U 2m ⊂ U 1m and thereforeW
the thinned codebook corresponding to the genie-informed messageW
m , wherê
m is given by (42). Eve attempts to decode X
m ) after subtracting the layers lower than l, denoted by X m and Y 2m , it can be shown that
Hence, Eve is able to decode X
m with an arbitrarily small error probability when N → ∞. By performing decoding for all l ∈ U 2m successively, Eve decodes X
m .
B. Decoding of X M +
We note that X M + can be partitioned as
and Eve performs the decoding of X M + through the following three steps:
M + directly based on Y 2 without using side information.
2) Decoding of X
M + jointly based on a list decoding argument, which is explained in details as in the following. A similar argument based on list decoding was given in [12] . The length of sequence X m is N (l 1m −l 2m ), and the length of super-sequence X is therefore N m∈M + (l 1m − l 2m ). Therefore, the length of a super-sequence depends on the channel realizations of h 1 and h 2 for a finite M . However, as M → ∞, it can be seen that the length does not depend on the channel realizations. 
That is, T m consists of the sequences such that the corresponding codewords coming from codebooks C [D1m∩U2m] are jointly typical with Y 2m given that X Suppose that X is the super-sequence corresponding to the transmitted codewords X
[D1]
M + . Given the two lists L(K) and T , Eve attempts to find X. Eve declares that X were sent, if X is the only common super-sequence in both L(K) and T . She declares an error if there is no super-sequence or more than one super-sequences in L(K) ∩ T . Hence, there are two error events correspondingly,
The Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) implies that Pr(E 1 ) ≤ ǫ 1 , where ǫ 1 → 0 as n → ∞. Pr(E 2 ) is bounded as the follows:
where L represents the size of the list L, and (61) follows from the uniform distribution of super-sequences in L(K).
To proceed, we need to give a bound on L . We denote the size of L m to be L m . For any m ∈ M + , L m can be bounded as the follows:
As M → ∞, by following steps similar as those for deriving (56), we have
Now we can combine (61) and (62) to obtain that
as n → ∞. Hence, the average error probability for decoding X
M + is bounded by
as n → ∞. Thus, Eve is able to find the right super-sequence X with a vanishing error probability. Since X and the group of codewords X
M + are related by a one-to-one mapping, we conclude that Eve is able to decode X
M + with a vanishing error probability. Finally, we conclude that Eve is able to decode X given Y 2 , the genie-informed (secret-key) information K, and the side informationW [U1] . Hence, Fano's inequality implies that
3) Decoding of X
as n → ∞. We thus complete the proof of (47).
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We can rewrite the secrecy key rate R s as
A. Evaluation of T 1
The under-braced term T 1i (h 1 ) can be evaluated by integrating by part. We have
By another integrating by part, we obtain
B. Evaluation of T 2
The under-braced term T 2i (h 1 ) can be rewritten as
Hence, T 2i (h 1 ) can be written as
To proceed, we need to interchange the operation of differentiation with respect to h 1 with the operation of integration over h 2 , where the integral domain is also a function of h 1 . We use the property that for any real differentiable function p(x, y), we can write d dx 
In particular, we have 
where we have used integrating by part to get to the last equality.
Putting (73) into (71), we have 30 Now, we can evaluate T 2 by
C. Evaluation of R s = T 1 − T 2
Using (69) and (75), and replacing the variable h 1 and h 2 with x and y, respectively, we have
which is (27) .
APPENDIX F PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The functional of (27) is defined by A necessary condition for a maximum of the integral of L(x, I(x), I ′ (x)) over x is a zero variation of the functional. For characterizing the optimal I(x), the Eüler-Lagrangian equation [32] gives a necessary condition denoted by
for which we have,
with d dx 
Using (78), (80), and (81) in (77), we have 
Hence, we proved Lemma 2. According to Lemma 1, the secrecy rate is R [1] s = Pr R [1] ≤ log(1 + h 1 P ) E h2 R [1] − log (1 + h 2 P )
where h * 1 = exp(R [1] ) − 1 /P . By using integrating by part for the integral in (83), we have
By letting t = (1 + h 2 P )/(λ 2 P ), we have
By using h * 1 = exp(R [1] ) − 1 /P , we can obtain (35).
APPENDIX H PROOF OF (36)
We can write 
and evaluate T 3 and T 4 separately. First, we have
To evaluate T 4 , we have 
